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I develop a two-stage political economy model that explicitly models the complexity of 
decision-making in the European Union on the Common Agricultural Policy, and I derive 
how the institutional design affects the outcome and the influence of the various agents 
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1.   Introduction 
Agriculture in the European Union (EU) is extensively regulated in the framework of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Within the CAP, a political process not the market 
decides major economic variables like prices and incomes. The decision-making on the 
CAP is institutionally complex. The European Commission and the Council of 
Agricultural Ministers play an important role in decision-making on the CAP.  
The Commission has the sole right of proposal: the Council of Ministers cannot 
formally consider any suggestion that has not come from the Commission. This gives the 
Commission considerable influence. The Council subsequently decides on policy 
proposal of the Commission. If the qualified majority in the Council does not approve the 
proposal, the Commission (in cooperation with the Council) drafts a new proposal until a 
final compromise is reached. 
Members of the Council of Ministers are supposed to further domestic interests of 
their countries. The reason is straightforward. Minister’s political life is determined by 
the outcome of election in his/her home country, which is a sufficient motivation for 
his/her promotion of domestic interests. The behavior of the Commission is less 
straightforward to explain.  
In its role, the Commission is by construction an ‘independent’ on member states 
collegiate body that represents the EU as a whole. According to Coleman and 
Tangermann (1999) the Commission uses its independence as entrepreneurial leader. The 
Commission can push its own preferences. On the other hand, Moravcsik (1994) argues 
that the Commission just decreases transaction costs of inter-country bargaining.  
Irrespective of the view on the Commission's behavior, I argue that its 
maneuvering space is dependent on the institutional structure of decision-making in the 
EU, namely on the voting rules adopted in the Council of Ministers and on changes in the 
external environments.  
There is significant literature on decision-making in the EU based on Shapley and 
Banzhaf indices (Winkler (1998), Widgren (1994), Hosli (1996), Bindseil and Hantke 
(1997) and others). Shapley and Banzhaf indices measure the probability that the 
Member State casts a decisive vote, i.e. Member State's potential to change the result of 
voting. Any coalition of Member States supporting a motion is possible and equally 
probable. That is, preferences of Member states are not considered as power indices 
analyze the voting body rather than the actual game played in it (Straffin, 1988). That is 
why this approach is not sufficient to analyze CAP where preferences of member states 
are crucial. 
Majority of studies in agricultural economics literature in decision-making on the   3
CAP is of analytically descriptive nature and provides a detailed account of historical 
development of the CAP, the context as well as motives behind certain decisions. (Tracy, 
1984, 1996, Neville-Rolfe, 1984, Harvey, 1982, Fearne 1991, Josling and Moyer 1991, 
Moyer and Josling, 1990,  Ackrill 2000, Pearce 1983, Wallace 1983 and others).  
There are however very few formal models of the decision-making on the CAP 
that explicitly consider preferences of Member States. One of the reasons why much 
discussion but little formal analysis is devoted to the CAP in the political economy 
literature is due to the complexity of modeling its two-stage decision-making process. In 
the first stage, national governments decide on their politically optimal agricultural 
protection level. In the second stage, the final (EU-level) choice of the support level 
results from a joint decision-making of the EU member state governments in the Council 
of Ministers and interaction between the Commission and the Council of Ministers. 
The paper has two objectives. First, a formal two-stage model of decision-making 
on the CAP of the EU is presented. Second, the model is used to derive results regarding 
the relative "powers" of various agents involved, and the likelihood of political stalemate. 
Furthermore, I show how these results change under different institutional assumptions, 
e.g. on voting procedures (majority rules), and how they are affected by changes in the 
external environment.  
I derive several results. The influence of the European Commission on the final 
policy decision depends on the voting rules. The occurrence of political stalemate is also 
a function of voting rule adopted in the Council of Ministers. I also show that the 
probability of a stalemate also depends on changes in external environments, which have 
taken place since the previous decision-making round.  
  The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 evaluates national preferences for 
protection of agriculture when the country is outside the EU and inside the EU. A two-
stage model of CAP decision-making process is presented in section 3. The two-stage 
model of CAP is used in sections 4, 5, and 6 to analyze simple majority voting, qualified 
majority, and unanimous agreement respectively. The final section summarizes the 
results and draws some conclusions.  
 
 2.  National Preferences on Agricultural Protection 
The CAP was first implemented at the end of the 1960s. The main aspect of the CAP was 
an intervention price for important commodities, including grains, sugar, beef, and milk, 
combined with the trade instruments (variable import levies and export refunds) needed 
to sustain this intervention price. The policy specifics differ between commodities and 
have changed over time. Due to several reforms of the CAP since then, the CAP has 
become more complex. However to keep the analysis tractable we assume in our model 
that there is one agricultural commodity and that the national governments and the 
Council of Ministers only have to decide on one policy variable: the intervention price 
for this agricultural commodity. 
  In this section, I first derive the politically optimal intervention price in a country 
when it is not part of the EU. Afterwards I derive how the politically optimal intervention 
price changes when the country becomes (or is) part of the EU, i.e. when it is one of the 
member states to which the CAP is applied. 
 
2.1.  Politically optimal national intervention outside the EU 
Assume there are two sectors in country j: agriculture (Aj) and the rest of the economy 
(Bj). Assume further that all individuals in the economy have identical preferences and 
maximize an indirect utility function U(yj
i), where yj
i  represents individual income and i 
= A,B.  Each sector has nj
i identical individuals with pre-policy income ej
i.   4
Let P
0 denote the market price of the agricultural commodity and Pj the 
intervention price in country j. Then per unit subsidy is sj = Pj – P
0. Rj
A is the total 
transfer of income to sector Aj. Rj
A depends on the intervention price and on agricultural 
production (Qj
A): Rj
A = (Pj - P
0).Qj
A = sj.Qj
A.   
For simplicity, I ignore deadweight costs. This may seem a rather strong 
assumption, given the impact of the CAP on distortions, which are therefore at the core 
of the debate on the CAP. However, in the context of this analysis it merely simplifies 
the notation, and does not significantly alter my conclusions.  
 
The transfer of income is financed from a tax (Rj
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  The politically optimal per unit subsidy is denoted as sj* = Pj* - P
0 and Pj* is the 
politically optimal intervention price in country j. By definition, the politically optimal 
intervention price implies that either increasing or decreasing the intervention price from 
the level Pj* reduces political support for the government of country j. In other words, 
countries have Euclidean single-peaked preferences over the domain of the policy 
variable, i.e. the intervention price. 
Formally this characteristic of Pj* can be derived from several underlying models 
on decision-making in the countries. For example, one model which yields this result is 
the model of Swinnen (1994) and Swinnen and de Gorter (1993, 1998). In their model, 
individual political support S
i  is assumed to be a strictly concave and an increasing 
function of the change in utility caused by the policy: Sj
i = Sj[v
i (Pj)], where vj
i (Pj) = Uj
i 
(Pj) - Uj
i (0) and where all individuals are assumed to have identical support functions. 
The politically optimal domestic intervention price is then determined by the government 
maximizing total political support, Γj, i.e.:  
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Hence, country j’s politically optimal intervention price, Pj*, is determined by: 
 










A’ refer to the first order derivatives of S
i, U
i respectively. This 
condition implies that ∂Γj /∂Pj < 0 for Pj > Pj* and ∂Γj /∂Pj > 0 for Pj < Pj*.   
 
2.2.  Politically optimal national intervention inside the EU, with the CAP 
Assume now that country j is part of the EU (i.e. member state j) and that the agricultural 
intervention price is part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). More specifically, 
we consider the effect of two important characteristics of the CAP: common prices and 
financial solidarity. The principle of common prices implies that the intervention price is 
                                                           
1  The tax on sector B can be implemented through an income tax or through higher consumer prices. 
Given our no deadweight cost assumptions, both are possible interpretations of our model.    5
the same in all member states
2. Financial solidarity implies that the balanced budget 
equation does not have to hold for each member state. It is only the overall EU balanced 






B for j 
=1...k.  Member states for which Rj
A > Rj
B are net beneficiaries of the CAP while 
member states for which Rj
A < Rj
B are net contributors to the CAP.   
Let Pj
# denote the politically optimal intervention price and sj
# the politically 
optimal per unit subsidy for a country inside the CAP. The politically optimal 
intervention price for a country outside the CAP (Pj*) would be lower for a country 
which is a net beneficiary of the CAP and vice versa for a net contributor to the CAP 
than its politically preferred price inside the CAP (Pj
#).  Specifically: 
 
If, ∀ Pj: 
Rj
A(Pj) > Rj
B(Pj) ⇒ Pj* < Pj
#       (5) 
Rj
A(Pj) < Rj
B(Pj) ⇒ Pj* > Pj
#       (6) 
 
The reasoning is straightforward. Some of the income going to agriculture of a 
net beneficiary of the CAP comes from taxes on other member states. Hence, the 
government can give higher subsidies to agriculture for a given tax on the rest of the 
domestic economy. Therefore, ceteris paribus, governments of net beneficiary member 
states will prefer higher intervention price than their domestic optimal intervention price 
would have been outside the CAP. However, the opposite also holds: governments of net 
contributing member states will prefer lower intervention price than their domestic 
optimal intervention price would have been outside the CAP.  For example, Mahé and 
Roe (1996) estimated inter-country transfers of income between member states of the EU 
caused by the CAP (table 1). According to their calculations, Belgium and Luxembourg, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal were net contributors to the CAP in 1996 
year. Ceteris paribus, these countries would therefore have higher politically optimal 
intervention prices on their own. Without financial solidarity under the CAP, transfers of 
income to domestic farmers would not require from domestic taxpayers and consumers to 
subsidize foreign farmers too. For a given tax on the rest of economy, agricultural 
producers would obtain more in net contributing countries without financial solidarity. 
On the other hand, Denmark, France, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, and Spain were 
net beneficiaries of the CAP in 1996. By analogy, their politically optimal prices would 
be lower without the financial solidarity, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.  A Model of the CAP Decision-Making Process 
The decision concerning the common intervention prices is made in the annual CAP 
review by the Council of Agricultural Ministers
3. A simple consultation procedure 
applies to most policy issues within the framework of the CAP. Under this procedure the 
EU Commission makes a proposal and the Council decides on the proposal, after 
receiving a non-binding opinion from the European Parliament. Decision-making in the 
Council proceeds by vote and qualified weighted majority is used. Currently the 
distribution of votes is: 
-10 votes each for Germany, France, Italy, and the UK; 
-8 votes for Spain; 
-5 votes each for Belgium, Netherlands, Greece, and Portugal; 
-4 votes each for Austria and Sweden; 
                                                           
2 We ignore exchange rate effects. 
3 The CAP decision-making process is discussed in, for  example, Tracy (1996) and Fearne (1991).   6
-3 votes each for Denmark, Finland, and Ireland; 
-2 votes for Luxembourg. 
To be accepted by “qualified majority”, a proposal must obtain 62 out of a total of 87 
votes. 
  Each member state can propose an amendment to the Commission proposal. The 
amendment is adopted if it is accepted unanimously. In practice, the Commission 
considers political acceptability of its proposal by the Council. Furthermore, in order to 
achieve the final compromise, the Commission may be “obliged” to adjust its proposals 
in accordance with the Council’s line of thinking (Fearne, 1991).  
I model the CAP decision-making as a set of voting rounds to determine the 
equilibrium intervention price within the Council of Ministers. Define PEU
0 as the 
existing common intervention price in the EU, i.e. the intervention price decided in last 
year’s decision-making round. We assume that at the beginning of the annual decision-
making round, the Commission proposes a common intervention price for the next year, 
PEU
N. This price can be the same as last year’s or a different one. 
  The Council of Ministers votes on the proposal. I assume that the voting behavior 
of each minister is determined by the politically optimal intervention price for the 
government the minister represents. More specifically, a minister will vote in favor of the 
proposal if the proposed price PEU
N is closer to his/her government’s optimum than the 
current price PEU
0 (or if it is the same). Formally: 
 
vj = 1 iff |PEU
N – Pj
# | ≤ | PEU
0 – Pj
# |     (8) 
vj = 0 iff |PEU
N – Pj
# | > | PEU
0 – Pj
# |     (9) 
 
where vj is the voting decision by minister j (i.e. of country j). The proposal is accepted if  
 
∑j nj
v.vj ≥  x        (10) 
 
where nj
v is the number of votes of country j and x the minimum amount of votes needed 
to approve the proposal. 
  I assume that, after the vote, either the Commission or a minister of a member 
state, can table a new proposal on which a new vote takes place. If the previous vote was 
approved, the newly approved common intervention price now becomes the price against 
which a new proposal is evaluated. Voting goes on until no new proposal is accepted. 
The intervention price which is chosen by the Council, the “equilibrium intervention 
price” PEU
M, is the last one which was approved. 
  It is obvious from equation (10) that the equilibrium intervention price will 
depend on the decision-making rules which determine the amount of votes needed, x, and 
on the distribution of votes, nj
V. In the next sections I will discuss the equilibrium 
intervention price under three different decision-making rules which are used in the EU. 
While the qualified majority rule is officially used by the Council of Ministers on most 
agricultural policy decisions, for expositional purposes I start with the analysis under 
assumption of a simple majority rule. This is simpler to analyze and it helps to 
understand the result in the more complicated analysis of qualified majority decision-




4.   Simple Majority Voting 
Assume the following order of the politically optimal intervention prices, Pj
#, of member   7
states: Country 1 has the lowest politically optimal price P1
#, country k has the highest 
politically optimal common price Pk
#. P1
# < P2
# … < Pk
#. Country 1 has n1
v votes in the 
Council, country 2 has n2
v
 votes, and country k has nk
v votes. Assume further that the 
countries together have an uneven number of votes in the Council (as it is currently the 
case in the EU-15, 87 votes) and that PM
# is the median politically optimal price. This is 
the politically optimal price of the country that has the 44
th vote. I refer to the country 
with PM
# as the politically optimal intervention price as the “median country”. 
In a single-dimensional issue
4, that is when, as assumed above, a decision 
concerns only one policy variable and if all voting agents have single-peaked preferences 
defined over the domain of the policy variable, then the median voter cannot lose under 
simple majority rule. This result is known as the “median voter” rule (Mueller, 1989). I 
have shown above that in the case I analyze the voters in the Council of Ministers, i.e. the 
Ministers, have single peaked preferences. The median voter rule therefore implies that 
the politically optimal price of the median country will be adopted as the common price. 
What would be the power of the European Commission under simple majority 
voting in the Council? The Commission would have no power to influence policies. 
There is an equilibrium outcome, the politically optimal price of a median country, which 
will be arrived at the final round of negotiations.   
 
5.  The CAP Intervention Price Decision under Qualified Majority Voting 
Assume again an ordering of the politically optimal intervention prices, Pj
# of member 
states as I did under simple majority rule. That is, country 1 has the lowest politically 
optimal price P1




# … < Pk
#. Country 1 has n1
v votes in the Council, country 2 has n2
v
 votes, and country 
k has nk
v votes. The existing common price, the result of previous year's negotiation is 
PEU
0. European Commission makes a new proposal PEU
N. The adoption of Commission's 
proposal requires at least 62 votes from Council members, otherwise the common price 
stays unchanged. 




 < 62,i.e. all countries with higher preferred optimal prices than country X 
cannot obtain 62 votes to approve Commission's proposal without country X. 
•  i=XΣ
kni
v ≥ 62, i.e. country X and all countries with higher optimal prices can obtain at 
least 62 votes to approve the proposal. 
As defined Country X is crucial for increasing the existing common price. 




  < 62,i.e. all countries with lower optimal prices than country Y cannot 
obtain 62 votes to approve Commission's proposal without country Y. 
•  i=1Σ
Yni
v ≥ 62, i.e. country Y and all countries with lower optimal prices can obtain at 
least 62 votes to approve the proposal. 
Similarly, country Y is crucial for decreasing the existing common price. 
 
Several results follow: 
 
If PEU
0 <  PX
#, PEU
N will be adopted iff  |PEU
N – PX
# | ≤ | PEU
0 – PX
# |    (11) 
That is PEU








N must be preferred by country X to status quo and must not be lower than politically 
                                                           
 
4 In multidimensional case the necessary and sufficient condition for existence of a dominant point under 
simple majority rule requires that it be a median in all directions (Mueller, 1989).     8
optimal level of country X, otherwise country X could propose its increase. The proposal 
of the European Commission will be accepted as final if PEU





# | ≤ | PEU
0 – PX





N will be adopted iff |PEU
N – PY
# | ≤ | PEU
0 – PY
# |    (13) 
That is PEU








N must be preferred by country Y to status quo and must not be bigger than politically 
optimal level of country Y, otherwise country Y could propose its decrease. The proposal 
of the European Commission will be accepted as final if PEU





# | ≤ | PEU
0 – PY
# |.       (14) 
That is the European Commission has some space to maneuver. Commission that 
prefers high agricultural protection would opt for the institutional price at the right-hand 
end of the acceptable ranges defined by 12 and 14. On the other hand, if the Commission 
is relatively less protective, it would propose the price at the left-hand side of the 
acceptable ranges 12 and 14. The outcome is therefore dependent upon other exogenous 
variables (not institutional design) like the ideological setup, national sympathies, or 




#, no Commission proposal, PEU
N will be adopted 
by a qualified majority in the Council. In other words, if the existing common price is 
located between the intervention prices of member states X and Y, then there is no 
qualified majority in the Council that agrees on its either increasing or decreasing. There 
is a stalemate that favors the maintenance of the status quo. This situation arises when 
there are no significant changes in agricultural economies of member states that would 
have an impact on politically optimal prices of member states. The probability that the 
previous year common price is inside the range PX
# - PY
# is higher the bigger qualified 
majority is needed.  
 
6.  The CAP Intervention Price Decision under Unanimity Rule 
Unanimity rule can be considered as an extreme version of the qualified majority rule. 
Unanimity rule requires all countries to agree with a new proposal; otherwise, the status 
quo will prevail. In the context of this model, this implies that the accepted price will 
always be between the lowest politically optimal intervention price of any country and 
the highest politically optimal price inside the CAP (Figure 1). When the existing price, 
which is the result of the negotiations of the previous round is located between these 
extreme politically optimal intervention prices, there can be no unanimous agreement on 
a change of the common price. Hence, there is extreme propensity to favor the 
maintenance of status quo under the unanimous agreement rule. The probability that the 
previous year common price is inside the P1
# - Pk
# range is high, especially for many 
diversified countries.  
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper I consider a two stage decision-making in the EU on the Common 
Agricultural Policy. In the first stage (national level) national governments choose their 
optimum policy level. Then I show that under various assumptions, the institutional 
structure of the CAP has an impact on the choice of the common intervention price for 
the EU.  
 
  Decision-making procedure in the EU provides some freedom to the European 
Commission to influence the final policy levels. The least powerful is the Commission 
under simple majority voting. Under simple majority the final common EU policy level   9
is decided by the median voter theorem. The ideological setup, national sympathies, or 
farming attitudes of the Commission or the Commissioner responsible for agriculture are 
unimportant for the equilibrium policy.  
The Commission can influence policy level under qualified majority (including 
unanimity). There are ranges of policy levels within which the Commission can choose 
its own optimum. A protective Commission would choose the lower ends of the policy 
level while 'liberal' Commission would opt for the upper end.  
With the rise of qualified majority the possibility of a stalemate also increases. 
The highest probability for a preservation of status-quo is when unanimous agreement is 
needed in the Council. Ceteris paribus, the higher the qualified majority voting, the 
higher the probability of preservation of status-quo.  
When the common price from the previous year’s negotiations stays between the 
politically optimal prices of two countries with lowest and highest respectively politically 
optimal prices needed to pass the new price deal, there is no sufficient qualified majority 
in the Council for the change of price. This feature reduces the maneuvering space of the 
Commission. In other words, for a given qualified majority voting, the bigger the change 
of agricultural economies of Member States, the bigger the power of the Commission to 
influence the policy level adopted in the Council.   
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Figure 1.  A distribution of politically optimal prices of member states   
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